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Abstract
A key assumption in many studies examining valuation of reward is that participants’
preferences for various rewards are meaningfully, monotonically ordered with respect to other
possible rewards. However, this assumption has not been systematically tested. Two studies
consisting of 74 undergraduates from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas and 122 community
members demonstrated nonmonotonic reward preferences when provided with parametrically
varied reward magnitudes. Although deficits in reward processing are believed to be a key
feature of depression, depressed participants were more willing to work hard for rewards and
exhibited more monotonic reward preferences than non-depressed participants. Relative to
imaginary rewards, participants were more willing to work for real money and spent more time
making decisions when there was a possibility of earning real money.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review
The degree to which people are willing to work harder for larger rewards is an important
measure to consider when studying individual differences in “wanting”. It is typically believed
that individuals display greater wanting and are willing to work harder for larger, more
meaningful rewards. As a result, a key assumption in many studies examining valuation of
reward is that participants’ preferences for various rewards are meaningfully, monotonically
ordered with respect to other possible rewards (Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, & Zald, 2012;
Treadway, Buckholtz, Schwartzman, Lambert, & Zald, 2009; Franzen & Brinkmann, 2015).
However, this assumption has not been systematically tested. If this assumption is not correct, it
limits the certainty of the conclusions that one can make in regards to studies operating under the
assumption. The current study attempts to standardize previous studies examining reward
processing by providing parametrically varied reward magnitudes. Additionally, previous studies
have not examined how absolute and relative reward differences affect choice behavior or
decision response times. The new information provided by the current study aims to identify
differences between normative and depressed reward processing to help better understand the
features of depression and guide future studies.
The current studies examine calculated reward preferences amongst pairs of monetary
rewards that differ in magnitude and required effort. These preferences are examined in
undergraduate students, community members with depression, and community members without
depression. As previously noted, there is a disparity of research in regards to the general
population’s reward preferences. Additionally, previous research on reward preferences of
individuals with depression have focused on their non-calculated, “gut”, reactions to rewards
rather than their ability to reason amongst different possible rewards (Treadway et al., 2009).
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Cognitive Biases, Reward Types, and Reward Valuation
Reward valuation does not exist in a vacuum independent of factors outside the reward
itself. Several factors influence and may distort the valuation of a reward’s magnitude relative to
other available rewards. For instance, numerical biases can interfere with an individual’s ability
to accurately assign value to a monetary reward when given a choice of multiple monetary
rewards. One of these biases is the whole number bias. The whole number bias refers to
comparing the whole number components of fractions rather than the entire fractions themselves,
therefore making an individual more likely to believe 1/8 is larger than 1/2 because 8 is larger
than 2 or that 7/10 is larger than 4/5 because 7 is larger than 4. Though this phenomenon was
originally studied in children, adults have been shown to exhibit this bias as well (DeWolf &
Vosniadou, 2015). The whole number bias is so influential that even expert mathematicians,
defined as individuals with a Master’s level math degree or higher, exhibit the bias when the
fractions being compared share either a common numerator or common denominator
(Obersteiner, Van Dooren, Van Hoof, & Verschaffel, 2013).
Another bias that interferes with accurate monetary valuation is the distance effect. The
distance effect refers to the tendency for more errors in quantity judgment to occur as the
similarity in magnitude increases amongst the numbers being compared. For example, people are
less likely to recognize that the number 44 is smaller than the number 51 than that the number 44
is smaller than the number 67. In addition to the distance effect, the whole number bias becomes
most prominent when the fractions being compared are very close in magnitude (DeWolf &
Vosniadou, 2015). For example, people are less likely to recognize that 5/8 is less than 6/7. An
exception to the distance effect is when decimal quantities are being compared; an increase in
quantity judgment errors occurs as the orthographic similarity of decimals become more alike,
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rather than their magnitude (Cohen, 2010). For example, a quantity judgment error is more likely
to occur when comparing the values .325 and .352 than when comparing the values .325 and
.348.
Individuals’ overall math abilities impact their ability to precisely value monetary
rewards. Jones, Price, and Randall (2011) found that college students commonly make errors in
basic mathematics; such errors include fraction to percentage conversion, solving for missing
values, basic arithmetic, and appropriate use of order of operations. Some of the difficulties
involving basic mathematics may abate over time, as repeated exposure to the same math
equations leads to a lesser error rate and a faster reaction time (Charness & Campbell, 1988).
Therefore, valuation accuracy may be affected if the same reward choices are presented several
times.
The nature of the potential reward affects one’s valuation of the reward. Imaginary
rewards are often used in studies examining wanting due to resource constraints. Miyapuram,
Tobler, Gregorios-Pippas, and Schultz (2012) demonstrated that participants rate imagined
rewards and real rewards as equally pleasant. These findings suggest that both real and
imaginary rewards share the same valuation systems. Additionally, both types of rewards display
similar patterns of delay discounting. Therefore minimal difference should be observed between
reward types even when the reward is not immediately administered (Johnson & Bickel, 2002).
Nevertheless, caution is required when using imaginary rewards, as individual differences in
delayed reward discounting may be dependent on one’s ability to imagine the reward accurately.
Those who are able to represent the reward with greater vividness display less discounting over
time (Hakimi & Hare, 2015).
Cognition and Reward Valuation
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Reappraisal of a reward, a form of cognitive affect regulation, is associated with
decreased pleasant anticipation, decreased reward seeking behavior, and decreased reward
encoding (Staudinger, Erk, & Walter, 2011). When individuals generate value predictions
associated with gains, the predictions are subsequently compared with actual outcomes to reveal
potential prediction errors; observed prediction errors often result in an adjustment of valuation
(Yacubian, Gläscher, Schroeder, Sommer, Braus, & Büchel, 2006).
Valuation is also affected by other current and past rewards. Although people may be
presented with the same choice, different neural processes handle the method in which they
process the choice. This is observed in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), a region of the brain
associated with reward valuation; OFC neurons show increased activation for relative rewards,
but not absolute rewards (Elliott, Agnew, & Deakin, 2008). When making a decision relative to
other choices, individuals tend to accurately adjust their choice preference when information
changes. By contrast, individuals who make decisions based on absolute values tend to not adjust
their preferences when new information is provided (Teodorescu, Moran, & Usher, 2015).
Although money is a secondary reward, a “common reward circuit” in the brain is activated by
both primary and secondary rewards (Sescousse, Caldú, & Segura, 2013).
The Role of Effort in Reward Discounting and Overvaluation
Another influence on reward valuation is reward discounting. Reward discounting refers
to the tendency for individuals to attribute less value to a reward if it is not made immediately
available. One situation in which discounting occurs is when a delay is present before receiving a
reward. Humans tend to discount future rewards as a hyperbolic function: There is a steep
discount when the delay is short, but as the length of time increases, the value decreases at a
much slower rate (Johnson, Herrmann, & Johnson, 2015; Scheres, de Water, & Miles, 2013; Zarr
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& Brown, 2014). Another factor is knowing the probability of obtaining a reward. As the
probability of obtaining a reward decreases, the reward is discounted hyperbolically (Greenhow,
Hunt, Macaskill, & Harper, 2015). Required physical effort also induces discounting. Humans
tend to discount effort-based rewards parabolically: There is a small discount when minimal
effort is required, but as the effort required increases, the value decreases at a much faster rate
(Hartmann, Hager, Tobler, & Kaiser, 2013).
Not all monetary rewards are discounted by effort at the same rate. Larger monetary
amounts are discounted at a lesser rate than smaller amounts (Ostaszewski, Bąbel, &
Swebodziński, 2013). When a reward is subjected to both a temporal delay and lesser
probability, the discounting effects of both are multiplicative rather than additive (Vanderveldt,
Green, & Myerson, 2015). However, when increased effort is required to obtain a reward,
individuals attribute greater value to the reward (Ma, Meng, Wang, & Shen, 2014). Although
individuals attribute greater value to rewards obtained through increased effort, they prefer easier
tasks to obtain the same reward despite attributing less value to it (Alessandri, Darcheville,
Delevoye-Turrell, & Zentall, 2008; Nishiyama, 2014). The increased valuation of rewards
obtained after greater effort has been exerted is often explained as cognitive dissonance, or the
justification effect; this phenomenon has been observed in human and nonhuman animals alike
and is used to personally justify why a person has put forth increased effort (Klein, Bhatt, &
Zentall, 2005).
Effort’s effects on decision-making are also observable through individuals’ preferences.
Individuals devalue effort-based rewards in a manner similar to delayed rewards (Prévost,
Pessiglione, Météreau, Cléry-Melin, & Dreher, 2010). As a result, it is likely that individuals will
stop valuing effort-based rewards much sooner than they would non-effort-based rewards.
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Kurniawan, Guitart-Masip, Dayan, and Dolan (2013) used fMRI to demonstrate that individuals
are sensitive to effort even when initially valuing rewards. Neural representations of anticipated
actions respond to anticipated demands, but they are insensitive to anticipated values of rewards.
Greater levels of effort results in a discount of outcome valuation, which aids in estimating a net
value that considers both cost and benefit.
Depression and Reward Processing
Depression is a clinical state that entails substantial deficits in wanting and reward
processing. Specifically, those diagnosed with major depressive disorder demonstrate less
motivation to obtain possible rewards (Ubl, Kuehner, Kirsch, Ruttorf, Diener, & Flor, 2015;
Whitton, Treadway, & Pizzagalli, 2015). Additionally, those diagnosed with depression
demonstrate a lower heart rate in response to potential rewards and also report having less
motivation to obtain rewards than healthy controls (Franzen & Brinkmann, 2015).
Effort expenditure for rewards task. The Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task
(EEfRT) is a measure of effort-based decision-making and reward valuation, allowing
researchers to examine wanting in normal and clinical populations (Treadway et al., 2009). The
task consists of multiple trials in which participants choose either an easy task for one dollar, or a
hard task for amounts varying from 1.24 to 4.30 dollars. These widely varying amounts were
chosen so that participants would not be likely to formally compute expected values for each
choice during a trial. The easy task requires participants to press a button with the index finger of
their dominant hand 30 times in 7 seconds; the hard task requires participants to press a button
with the little finger of their non-dominant hand 100 times in 21 seconds. Participants are not
guaranteed to win money on each trial, instead they are informed of the probability of winning
the differing monetary amounts for each successful trial: 88%, 50%, or 12%. Once the monetary
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values and probability are presented, participants are given 5 seconds to choose either the easy or
the hard task. If a participant does not specify a choice, they are randomly assigned to one of the
tasks. When each task begins, a bar fills with each button press to represent the participants’
progress towards reaching the required number of presses. After each trial, the participant is
informed whether the trial was a success or failure. After the participant has engaged in the task
for 20 minutes, two trials’ winnings are chosen based on the displayed probabilities, and
participants are rewarded that amount.
The EEfRT was initially used to examine differences in wanting among individuals with
anhedonia, but it has more recently been expanded to look at individuals with Major Depressive
Disorder (MDD; Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, & Zald, 2012). The authors found that
individuals with MDD chose the high effort, high reward tasks less often than individuals in the
control group. Additionally, the MDD group showed less sensitivity to information regarding the
magnitude of the rewards and the probabilities of receiving the rewards than the control group.
Thus, in addition to having findings that are in agreement with the results of a memory task used
by Franzen and Brinkmann (2015) that individuals with MDD demonstrate motivational deficits,
Treadway et al. (2012) found that individuals with MDD also demonstrate decision-making
deficits.
Decision Making and Depressive Realism
Treadway et al.’s (2009) EEfRT was designed to explicitly emphasize gut-level decision
making over calculated decision making by presenting non-parametric monetary pairs. Although
the EEfRT gives a glimpse into potential differences in affective wanting, it does not allow for
the examination of potential differences in planned decision-making.
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Depressive realism is a term that describes the tendency for individuals with Major
Depressive Disorder to make more accurate inferences than individuals without Major
Depressive Disorder (Moore & Fresco, 2012). Not all studies support depressive realism, Allan,
Siegel, and Hannah (2007) explain the phenomenon as non-depressed individuals being overly
optimistic when given information, whereas depressed individuals are more pessimistic and
require more evidence before they believe something will occur. In regards to perceptual
accuracy Moore and Fresco’s (2012) meta-analysis found a small effect of depressive realism
across 75 studies.
Depressive realism also has an effect on non-clinical populations in regards to time
estimation. Those with higher scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), higher scores
indicating higher levels of depressive symptomatology, demonstrated more accuracy when asked
to estimate the amount of time passed from an initial point. Participants in this study consisted of
non-clinically depressed college students. Previous studies have not found an effect of depressive
realism on time estimation in clinical populations (Kornbrot & Grimwood, 2013).
Non-depressed and depressed individuals demonstrate differences in decision-making
when making decisions regarding money, health, and interpersonal relationships for themselves
versus others. (Garcia-Retamero, Okan, & Maldonado, 2015). Non-depressed individuals
demonstrate a bias of making riskier decisions for themselves than they do for others. They also
show a bias by predicting that others would make riskier decisions than they would make for
themselves. Depressed individuals demonstrated a bias towards making less risky decisions for
others than they would for themselves, but they did not demonstrate a bias when predicting
others’ decisions (Garcia-Retamero, Okan, & Maldonado, 2015). The differences demonstrated
between non-depressed and depressed individuals in regards to predicting others’ decisions

8

provide support for depressive realism in regards to money, health, and interpersonal
relationships.
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Chapter 2: Current Studies
Study 1
The first study examined the assumption in previous studies that reward preferences are
meaningfully and monotonically ordered using a modified EEfRT that is described below. I
analyzed reward choices and reaction times of the choices of undergraduates who completed the
task for imaginary monetary rewards. This pilot study was designed to better understand
differences in absolute and relative reward valuation across time.
Hypotheses
Although there is some evidence, such as the above mentioned biases, that suggests the
contrary, I predicted that participants’ choices would be monotonically and meaningfully
ordered; participants would be more willing to exert greater effort as the discrepancy between
monetary reward values increases. Additionally, participants would make faster decisions in
regards to reward preference as they progress through the experiment due to their increased
familiarity with the available choices.
Study 2
The second study built on the first, using real monetary rewards to identify potential
deficits in reward preferences of individuals with depression relative to healthy controls.
Additionally, the second study allows for a comparison of reward preferences between imaginary
and real monetary rewards when analyzed in regards to the first study. Specifically, I analyzed
reward choices and reaction times of choices of community members who engaged in the same
modified EEfRT.
Hypotheses
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Once again although some phenomena, such as depressive realism, suggest the contrary, I
predicted similar results to Treadway et al. (2009), such that depressed participants would make
fewer accurate decisions in regards to reward magnitude than individuals with the control group;
that is, unlike the control group, individuals in the depression group would not make
monotonically ordered choices. Based on previous work, I also expected depressed participants
to choose the hard task less frequently than control participants. Additionally, participants in
both groups would make faster decisions in regards to reward preference as they progress
through the experiment due to becoming aware of the available choices.
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Chapter 3: Method
Study 1
Participants
Participants consisted of 74 (67% female) undergraduate students from the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas via the Sona system. The mean participant age was 21.2 years. In total,
50.7% of participants were White, 16% were African American, 10.6% were Asian, 11.9% were
Pacific Islander, and 5.3% identified as some other racial group; 29.3% of participants identified
as Hispanic.
Participants were excluded if they did not complete at least 50% of the trials (n = 1) or
had a trial success rate below 60% across the entire experiment (n = 8) due to the task being
designed to have a success rate of approximately 90%. Individual trials were excluded (n = 11)
if the choice reaction time for the trial was 2.5 standard deviations larger from a given
participant’s mean reaction time. This left a total of 65 participants and 3,860 trials.
Modified EEfRT
Before each trial, participants were given the option to engage in an easy trial for
less money or a hard trial for more money. The fiscal pairs were as follows: $1.00 vs. $0.50,
$1.50 vs. $0.50, $2.00 vs. $0.50, $4.00 vs. $0.50, $1.50 vs. $1.00, $2.00 vs. $1.00, $4.00 vs.
$1.00, $2.00 vs. $1.50, $4.00 vs. $1.50, and $4.00 vs. $2.00. Participants encountered each
choice six times throughout the experiment, for a total of 60 choice trials in the experiment. The
order of the pairs that participants encountered were determined by a fixed run order that was
dependent on their assigned participant number. There were also 30 “forced” trials interspersed
throughout the experiment in which participants were presented with an easy or hard trial
without being given a choice of which one they would like to engage in. The forced trials were
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included to collect psychophysiological data in regards to specific levels of reward. Data from
these trials were not analyzed here, as there was no choice that the participant made.
Easy trials were completed by pressing either the number line 1 (for left-handed
participants) or the number pad 5 (for right-handed participants) key 18 times in four seconds
while using the index finger of their dominant hand. The hard trials were completed by pressing
the opposite key 58 times in twelve seconds while using the little finger of their non-dominant
hand. When each task began, an on-screen timer appeared and a bar would fill with each button
press to represent the participants’ progress towards reaching the required number of presses. If
the bar was completely filled before the timer reached zero, then the trial was considered
successful.
Besides using pairs of five fixed amounts that varied for both easy and hard tasks to
examine choice strategies, we modified the orthodox EEfRT in three additional ways. We
shortened the durations of both the easy and hard tasks to lessen the potential for fatigue. Our
task lasted 30 minutes instead of 20 minutes to allow for collection of psychophysiological as
well as behavioral data. Finally, we removed the probability manipulation to make the task easier
for participants in anticipation of using it in less numerically adept community samples.
Procedures
Participants read and signed a consent form before being allowed to participate in the
study. They were then informed that the money they could earn during the experiment was
conceptual, and that they would receive no financial reward regardless of choices. Participants
were provided with a computer keyboard and sat 100 cm away from a 19” LED monitor that
displayed instructions and information regarding the task. They completed the EEfRT for 30

13

minutes as part of a larger battery of tasks that took approximately two hours in total. After all
tasks were completed, participants received course credits for their participation.
Study 2
Participants
Participants consisted of 122 (55% female) community members recruited from an ad on
Craigslist; the ad specified that after an initial over-the-phone interview, those who qualified
would be invited to the lab for a 4 hour study and be compensated $100 with the opportunity to
win as much as an additional $12 for completing a series of tasks. The sample included 90
individuals currently experiencing a major depressive episode and 32 healthy controls.
Individuals diagnosed with a psychotic disorder or who have ever had a manic episode were
excluded due to differences in reward referencing not caused by a depressive episode. The mean
participant age was 33.7 years. In total, 55.0% of participants were white, 22.5% were African
American, 15.8% were Asian, 2.5% were Pacific Islander, 0.8% were Native American or Native
Alaskan, and 3.7% identified as some other racial group; 12.4% of participants identified as
Hispanic.
Participants were excluded if they did not complete at least 50% of the trials (n = 2 in the
depressed group, n = 1 in the control group) or had a trial success rate below 60% across the
entire experiment (n = 5 in the depressed group, n = 1 in the control group) due to the task being
designed to have a success rate of approximately 90%. Individual trials were excluded (n = 159)
if the choice reaction time for the trial was 2.5 standard deviations larger from a given
participant’s mean reaction time. This left a total of 83 participants in the depression group, 30
participants in the control group, and 6,531 trials.
Measures
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Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology (Clinician-Rated; IDS-C). The IDS-C is a
30 item, clinician administered assessment. It assesses the severity of depression symptoms and
addresses all criterion of a major depressive episode specified by the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders - 4th edition (DSM-IV). All questions pertain to the seven days
prior the assessment, with the exception of weight loss and gain questions, which pertain to the
prior 14 days. Rush, Gullion, Basco, Jarrett, and Trivedi (1996) demonstrated good internal
consistency for a sample of healthy controls and adult outpatients with Major Depressive
Disorder with a Cronbach’s alpha of .94; our sample’s IDS-C total scores also had a Cronbach’s
alpha of .94. The maximum score possible on the IDS is 84. Individuals who scored between 0
and 7 were placed into the control group; for comparison, scores at or between 0 and 11
represent a level of symptomatology consistent with no depression (Rush et al., 1996).
Individuals who scored at 24 or greater were placed into the depression group. For comparison,
scores between 24 and 36 indicate moderate levels of depressive severity, scores between 37 and
46 represent severe depression, and scores 47 or above index very severe (Rush et al., 1996).
Those who scored at or between 8 and 23 did not qualify to participate in the study.
Structured Clinical Interview I for DSM-IV-Text Revision: Mood Episodes. The
Structured Clinical Interview I for DSM-IV-Text Revision (SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, &
Williams, 2002) is a semi-structured clinical interview designed to assess the diagnostic criteria
for disorders listed in the DSM-IV-TR. In this study, we used the Mood Episodes module to
screen out individuals who met criteria for any current or past manic episodes.
Procedures
The procedure of study 2 was almost identical to those of study 1 with a few exceptions.
First, participants were grouped according to their depression scores, but they were not informed
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of their group membership. Second, participants were able to win real money. Before beginning
the task, participants were informed that three trials would be chosen at random, regardless of
whether they are successes or failures, and they received the winnings for only those three trials.
There was no significant difference between the amounts won by individuals in the depressed
group (M = $5.36, SD = $2.82) and individuals in the control group (M = $4.37, SD = $2.67);
t(118) = 1.70, p = .091.
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis
Study 1
In four separate Generalized Estimating Equations (GEEs), I examined the dependent
variables of a) the proportion of hard choices made and b) participants’ reaction time to make
each choice. For each dependent variable, data across fiscal pairs were analyzed by both the a)
absolute Difference (i.e., hard – easy reward value) and b) relative Ratio (i.e., hard/easy reward
value) between reward options as within-subjects factors. Examining pairs by their absolute
difference assumes that individuals are making valuations between monetary amounts via
subtraction. Examining pairs by their relative ratio assumes that individuals are making
valuations between monetary amounts via division. Each GEE also included whether trials were
in the first or second Half of the experiment to examine how participants may have changed their
behavior across the experiment. Because not every pair had identical numbers of trials within it,
we elected to aggregate data over halves of the experiment instead of analyzing data trial by trial.
Each GEE used a factorial model and an unstructured covariance matrix to analyze the
data. I used a binomial distribution with a logit link function for GEEs analyzing the proportion
of hard choices. For GEEs analyzing reaction times, we used a normal distribution with a
logarithmic link for reaction times to correct for the significant skewness of 2.96 before
transformation of absolute differences and 2.87 before transformation of relative ratios of these
data. Participant number was the subject factor.
Significant results were followed up by sequential Sidak comparisons for each individual
monetary pair to control Type I error. Half x Difference and Half X Ratio interactions were only
compared by different monetary pairs within a specific half of the experiment and the same pair
across halves of the experiment. A target α level of .05 was used for all analyses.
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Preliminary Analyses
To ensure that no single value was associated with excessively high or low choices of the
easy or hard task, I examined the Easy x Hard value interaction in a Generalized Estimating
Equation (GEE) with the proportion of hard choices made as the dependent variable. As
displayed in Table 1, there was a significant interaction effect of easy choice value and hard
choice value, Wald χ²(3) = 13.4, p = .004. This substantially qualified the main effects of easy
choice value, Wald χ²(3) = 45.3, p < .001 and hard choice value, Wald χ²(3) = 49.0, p < .001. The
observed pattern of results suggests that that no one monetary value is driving participants’
choices.
Absolute Difference
Choices. There was a significant Difference x Half interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 32.3, p >
.001. This substantially qualified the main effects of absolute differences, Wald χ²(6) = 64.6, p <
.001, and half of the experiment, Wald χ²(1) = 36.8, p < .001. The relevant pairwise comparisons
with a sequential Sidak adjustment are represented in Figure 1; significant differences among
means are detailed below.
In the first half of the experiment, the hard task was chosen less often with pairs differing
by $0.50 than pairs differing by $1.50, and $2.50, and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 16.6, ps < .005. The
hard task was chosen less often during pairs differing by $1.00 than pairs differing by $1.50, and
$2.50 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 13.9, ps < .010. Unexpectedly, the hard task was chosen more
often during pairs differing by $1.50 than those differing by $2.00, Wald χ²(1) = 11.1, p = .03.
The hard task was chosen less often during pairs that differed by $2.00 than pairs that differed by
$3.00 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 13.7, ps < .019.
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In the second half of the experiment, the hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs
that differed by $0.50 and $1.00 than in pairs that differed by $3.50, Wald χ²(1)s > 11.6, ps <
.046. When comparing the same absolute differences across halves of the experiment, the hard
task was chosen more frequently in pairs that differed by $1.50, first half of the experiment
compared to the second half of the experiment, Wald χ²(1)s = 33.8 ps < .001.

Figure 1. Choices of undergraduates by absolute differences. Absolute differences not sharing a
common letter within a half represents a significant difference of choices. Asterisks denote
significant differences between halves at a specific absolute difference.
Reaction time. There were significant main effects of Difference, Wald χ²(6) = 26.7, p <
.001, and Half, Wald χ²(1) = 45.0, p < .001, on choice reaction time. However, there was no
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Difference x Half interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 7.00, p = .321. The pairwise comparisons with a
sequential Sidak adjustment of these results are displayed in Figure 2 and summarized below.
Throughout the entire experiment, reaction times of choosing either the easy or hard task
were faster for pairs that differed by $3.00 than pairs that differed by $0.50 and $1.00, Wald
χ²(1)s > 9.5, ps < .04. Additionally, pairs in the second half of the experiment were chosen faster
than pairs in the first of the experiment, Wald χ²(1)s > 54.3, p < .001.

Figure 2. Reaction times of undergraduates by absolute differences. Absolute differences not
sharing a common letter represent a significant difference of choices. The asterisk denotes a
significant difference between halves.
Choices. There was a significant Ratio x Half interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 29.7, p < .001,
which substantially qualified the main effects of relative Ratio, Wald χ²(6) = 66.9, p < .001, and
20

Half of the experiment, Wald χ²(1) = 38.7, p = .001. The relevant pairwise comparisons with a
sequential Sidak adjustment are represented in Figure 3 and summarized below.
In the first half of the experiment, the hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had
ratios of 1.33 than pairs that had ratios of 2.67 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 12.8, ps < .02. The hard
task was chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 1.50 than pairs that had ratios of 2.00 and
more, Wald χ²(1)s > 11.9, ps < .02. The hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had a
ratio of 2.00 than pairs that had ratios of 2.67, 4.00, and 8.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 25.0, ps < .001. The
hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 3.00 than pairs that had ratios of 4.00
Wald χ²(1)s > 15.1, p = .004.
In the second half of the experiment, the hard task was chosen less often with pairs that
had ratios of 1.33, 1.50, and 2.00 than pairs that had ratios of 2.67 and 8.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 18.4,
ps < .001. Although unexpected, the hard task was chosen more often with pairs that had ratios
of 2.67 than pairs that had ratios of 3.00 and 4 Wald χ²(1)s > 11.8, ps < .031.The hard task was
chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 3.00 than pairs that had ratios of 8.00, Wald χ²(1)s
= 11.5, p = .024.
Across halves of the experiment, the hard task was chosen more often with pairs that had
ratios of 2.00, 3.00, and 4.00 in their first-half appearances compared to their second-half
appearances, Wald χ²(1)s > 12.1, ps < .024.
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Figure 3. Choices of undergraduates by relative ratio. Relative ratios not sharing a common letter
within a half represents a significant difference of choices. Asterisks denote significant
differences between halves at a specific relative ratio.
Reaction time. There was a significant Ratio x Half interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 12.8, p =
.046, which substantially qualified the main effects of relative Ratio, Wald χ²(6) = 36.3, p < .001,
and Half of the experiment, Wald χ²(1) = 52.6, p < .001. The relevant pairwise comparisons with
a sequential Sidak adjustment are represented in Figure 4 and summarized below.
In the first half of the experiment, pairs with ratios of 1.33 were chosen faster than pairs with
ratios of 3.00 and 4.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 19.6, ps < .002. There were no significant differences
among ratios in the second half of the experiment, Wald χ²(1)s < 6.06, ps > .002. Across halves
of the experiment, reaction times for choosing either the easy or hard task were faster for pairs
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with ratios of 2.00, 2.67, 3.00, and 4.00 in the second half of the experiment than the first half,
Wald χ²(1)s > 20.3, ps < .002.

Figure 4. Reaction times of undergraduates by relative ratio. Relative ratios not sharing a
common letter in the first half represents a significant difference of choices. Asterisks denote
significant differences between halves at a specific relative ratio.
Study 2
In four separate Generalized Estimating Equations (GEEs), I examined the dependent
variables of a) the proportion of hard choices made and b) participants’ reaction time to make
each choice. For each dependent variable, data across fiscal pairs were analyzed by both the a)
absolute Difference (i.e., hard – easy reward value) and b) relative Ratio (i.e., hard/easy reward
value) between reward options as within-subjects factors. Examining pairs by their absolute

23

difference assumes that individuals are making valuations between monetary amounts via
subtraction. Examining pairs by their relative ratio assumes that individuals are making
valuations between monetary amounts via division, which is a more complex mental operation
and may be influenced by more of the biases listed above (e.g., the whole-number bias). Each
GEE also included a) the group that each participant was categorized (depressed or control) to
identify differences between depressed and typical reward processing and b) trials were in the
first or second Half of the experiment to examine how participants may have changed their
behavior across the experiment. Because not every pair had identical numbers of trials within it,
we elected to aggregate data over halves of the experiment instead of analyzing data trial by trial.
Each GEE used a factorial model and an unstructured covariance matrix to analyze the
data. We used a binomial distribution with a logit link function for GEEs analyzing the
proportion of hard choices. For GEEs analyzing reaction times, we used a normal distribution
with a logarithmic link for reaction times to correct for the significant skewness of 3.19 before
transformation of absolute differences and 3.41 before transformation of relative ratios of these
data. Participant number was the subject factor.
Significant results were followed up by sequential Sidak comparisons for each individual
monetary pair to control Type I error. Group x Difference, Group x Ratio, Group x Half, Half x
Difference, and Half X Ratio interactions were only compared by different monetary pairs within
a specific half of the experiment and the same pair across halves of the experiment. A target α
level of .05 was used for all analyses.
Preliminary Analyses
To ensure that no single value was associated with excessively high or low choices of the
easy or hard task, I examined the Easy x Hard value interaction in a Generalized Estimating
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Equation (GEE) with the proportion of hard choices made as the dependent variable. As
displayed in Table 2, there was a significant interaction effect of easy choice value and hard
choice value, Wald χ²(3) = 15.0, p = .002. This substantially qualified the main effects of easy
choice value Wald χ²(3) = 91.9, p < .001, and hard choice value Wald χ²(3) = 72.4, p < .001.
However, this pattern was similar across groups, Easy Value x Hard Value x Group Wald χ²(3) =
4.26, p = .235. The observed pattern of results suggests that although participants chose the
$4.00 value more frequently than other values, it was not to such a degree that it deterred them
from choosing other values.
Absolute Difference
Choices: Difference x Half. There was a significant Difference x Half interaction, Wald
χ²(6) = 13.1, p = .042. This substantially qualified the main effect of absolute difference, Wald
χ²(6) = 153, p < .001; there was no main effect of experiment half on the choice of easy versus
hard trial, Wald χ²(1) = 0.83, p = .361. The relevant pairwise comparisons with a sequential
Sidak adjustment are represented in Figure 5 significant differences among means are detailed
below.
In the first half of the experiment, the hard task was chosen less often with pairs differing
by $0.50 than all other pairs, Wald χ²(1)s > 35.0, ps < .002. The hard task was chosen less often
during pairs differing by $1.00 than pairs differing by $1.50, $2.50 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 25.7,
ps < .002. Surprisingly, the hard task was chosen more often during pairs differing by $1.50 than
those differing by $2.00, Wald χ²(1) = 9.35, p = .003. The hard task was chosen less often during
pairs differing by $1.50 than those differing by $3.50, Wald χ²(1) = 28.4, p = .003.The hard task
was chosen less often during pairs that differed by $2.00 than pairs that differed by $2.50 and
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more, Wald χ²(1)s > 13.8, p = .002. The hard task was chosen less often during pairs differing by
$2.50 and $3.00 than those differing by $3.50, Wald χ²(1)s < 16.1, ps > .003.
In the second half of the experiment, the hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs
that differed by $0.50 than all other pairs, Wald χ²(1)s > 14.2, ps < .003. The hard task was
chosen less frequently in pairs that differed by $1.00 compared to those that differed by $1.50 or
more, Wald χ²(1)s > 13.4, ps < .003. The hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs that
differed by $1.50 compared to those that differed by $2.50 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 9.25, ps <
.004. The hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs that differed by $2.00 compared to those
that differed by $2.50 or more, Wald χ²(1)s > 20.3, ps < .003. The hard task was chosen less
frequently in pairs that differed by $2.50 compared to those that differed by $3.50, Wald χ²(1) =
10.8, p = .003.
Choices: Difference x Group. There was also a significant Difference x Group
interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 21.1, p = .002. This substantially qualified the main effects of absolute
differences, Wald χ²(6) = 153, p < .001; there was no main effect of group, Wald χ²(1) = 1.84, p
= .175. The relevant pairwise comparisons with a sequential Sidak adjustment are represented in
Figure 5; significant differences among means are detailed below.
For individuals in the depressed group, the hard task was chosen less often with pairs
differing by $0.50 than all other pairs, Wald χ²(1)s > 41.1, ps < .002. The hard task was chosen
less often during pairs differing by $1.00 than pairs differing by $1.50 and more, Wald χ²(1)s >
20.4, ps < .003. The hard task was chosen less often during pairs differing by $1.50 than those
differing by $2.50 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 11.5, ps < .004. The hard task was chosen less often
during pairs that differed by $2.00 than pairs that differed by $2.50 and greater, Wald χ²(1)s >
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13.1, ps < .003. The hard task was chosen less often during pairs differing by $2.50 and $3.00
than those differing by $3.50, Wald χ²(1)s > 8.3, ps < .004.
For individuals in the control group, the hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs that
differed by $0.50 than all other pairs, Wald χ²(1)s > 14.4, ps < .003. The hard task was chosen
less frequently in pairs that differed by $1.00 compared to those that differed by all pairs except
$2.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 27.2, ps < .002. Surprisingly, the hard task was chosen more frequently in
pairs that differed by $1.50 compared to those that differed by $2.00, Wald χ²(1) = 11.2, p =
.003. The hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs that differed by $1.50 compared to those
that differed by $3.50, Wald χ²(1) = 18.5, p = .003.The hard task was chosen less frequently in
pairs that differed by $2.00 compared to those that differed by $2.50 or more, Wald χ²(1)s >
20.1, ps < .002. The hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs that differed by $2.50
compared to those that differed by $3.50, Wald χ²(1) = 18.7, p = .002.
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Figure 5. Choices of depressed and control participants by absolute difference. Absolute
differences not sharing a common uppercase letter represents a significant difference of choices
within the first half. Absolute differences not sharing a common lowercase letter represents a
significant difference of choices within the second half. Absolute differences not sharing a
common number represents a significant difference of choices within the corresponding color’s
group.
Reaction time. There was a significant Difference x Half interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 26. 9,
p < .001. This substantially qualified the main effects of absolute differences, Wald χ²(6) = 31.8,
p < .001 and experiment half, Wald χ²(1) = 6.33, p = .012. There were no interactions involving
or main effects of group, Wald χ²s < 9.81, ps > .133. The relevant pairwise comparisons with a
sequential Sidak adjustment are represented in Figure 6; significant differences among means are
detailed below.
In the second half of the experiment, reaction times for choosing either the easy or hard
task were faster for pairs that differed by $0.50 than pairs that differed by $3.50, Wald χ²(1) =
16.6, p = .004. Reaction times for choosing either the easy or hard task were faster for pairs that
differed by $1.00 than pairs that differed by $3.50, Wald χ²(1) = 13.1, p = .023. Across halves of
the experiment, pairs that differed by $0.50 were chosen slower in the first half of the experiment
than the second half of the experiment, Wald χ²(1) =19.0, p = .001.
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Figure 6. Reaction times of depressed and control participants by absolute difference. Absolute
differences not sharing a common uppercase letter represents a significant difference of reaction
times within the first half. Absolute differences not sharing a common lowercase letter represents
a significant difference of reaction times within the second half. Asterisks denote significant
differences between halves at a specific absolute difference.
Relative Ratio
Choices. There was a significant Ratio x Group interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 18.17, p = .006,
which substantially qualified the main effect of relative Ratio, Wald χ²(6) = 132.8, p < .001;
there was no significant main effect of Group, Wald χ²(6) = 1.73, p = .188. There were no
significant interactions involving or main effects of experiment half, Wald χ²s < 6.55, ps > .365.
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The relevant pairwise comparisons with a sequential Sidak adjustment are represented in Figure
7 and summarized below.
Across groups, individuals in the depressed group chose the hard task for pairs that
differed by 1.33 more often than those who were in the control group, Wald χ²(1) = 17.3, p =
.003. In the depressed group, the hard task was chosen more often with pairs that had ratios of
1.33 than pairs that had ratios of 1.50, Wald χ²(1)s > 8.56, ps < .004. The hard task was chosen
less often with pairs that had ratios of 1.33 than pairs that had ratios of 2.00 and greater, Wald
χ²(1)s > 20.6, ps < .003. The hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 1.50
than all other pairs, Wald χ²(1)s > 52.9, ps < .002. The hard task was chosen less often with pairs
that had a ratio of 2.00 than pairs that had ratios of 2.67, 4.00, and 8.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 48.6, ps <
.002. Although unexpected, the hard task was chosen more often with pairs that had ratios of
2.67 than pairs that had ratios of 3.00 and 4.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 15.2, ps < .003. The hard task was
chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 2.67 than pairs that had ratios of 8.00, Wald χ²(1) =
8.87, p = .004.The hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 3.00 than pairs
that had ratios of 4.00 and greater Wald χ²(1)s > 33.5, ps < .002. The hard task was chosen less
often with pairs that had ratios of 4.00 than pairs that had ratios of 8.00, Wald χ²(1) = 48.2, p =
.002.
In the control group, the hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 1.33
than pairs that had ratios of 2.00 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 12.8, ps < .003. The hard task was
chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 1.50 than pairs that had ratios of 2.00 and more,
Wald χ²(1)s > 12.1, ps < .004. The hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had a ratio of
2.00 than pairs that had ratios of 2.67, 4.00, and 8.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 45.1, ps < .002. Although
unexpected, the hard task was chosen more often with pairs that had ratios of 2.67 than pairs that
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had ratios of 3.00, Wald χ²(1) = 18.3, p = .003. The hard task was chosen less often with pairs
that had ratios of 2.67 than pairs that had ratios of 8.00, Wald χ²(1) = 9.90, p = .004. The hard
task was chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 3.00 than pairs that had ratios of 4.00 and
greater, Wald χ²(1)s > 33.5, ps < .002. The hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had
ratios of 4.00 than pairs that had ratios of 8.00, Wald χ²(1) = 33.5, p < .001.

Figure 7. Choices of depressed and control participants by relative ratio. Relative ratios not
sharing a common number represents a significant difference of choices within the
corresponding color’s group. Asterisks denote significant differences between halves at a
specific relative ratio.
Reaction time. There was a significant Ratio x Half interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 23.0, p =
.001, which substantially qualified the main effect of relative Ratio, Wald χ²(6) = 40.79, p < .001
and experiment half, χ²(1) = 9.44, p = .002. There were no interactions involving or main effects
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of group, Wald χ²s < 2.04, ps > .153. The relevant pairwise comparisons with a sequential Sidak
adjustment are represented in Figure 8 and summarized below.
There were no significant differences in reaction times among ratios in the first half of
the experiment, Wald χ²(1)s > 6.06, ps < .002. In the second half of the experiment, pairs with
ratios of 1.33 and 1.50 were chosen faster than pairs with ratios of 8.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 12.5, ps <
.033.

Figure 8. Reaction times of depressed and control participants by relative ratio. Relative ratios
not sharing a common uppercase letter represents a significant difference of reaction times
within the first half. Absolute differences not sharing a common lowercase letter represents a
significant difference of reaction times within the second half.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
The current studies examined reward preferences in three different populations:
undergraduate students from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas; community members
experiencing a major depressive episode; and community members not experiencing a major
depressive episode. In Study 1, undergraduate students demonstrated a greater willingness to
work harder for imaginary monetary rewards in the first half of the experiment than in the second
half of the experiment. Contrary to my hypothesis, participants displayed nonmonotonic reward
preferences by overvaluing monetary pairs that had an absolute difference of $1.50 or a relative
difference of 2.67. In the second half of the experiment, participants corrected their
overvaluation of pairs that differed by $1.50 to assume a roughly monotonic reward preference
pattern. Although participants were able to correct their overvaluation for absolute differences,
their overvaluation of pairs that had a ratio of 2.67 persisted throughout the entire experiment.
In Study 2, community members demonstrated a similar pattern of results as the
undergraduate sample, which suggests the observed nonmonotonic reward preferences were not
type I error. Community members as a whole were more willing to work harder for real
monetary rewards in the first half of the experiment compared to the second half when the
monetary pairs were examined by their absolute difference. This effect was not present when
pairs were examined by their relative ratio. Community members who were not experiencing a
major depressive episode also overvalued absolute differences of $1.50 and relative ratios of
2.67; these overvaluations persisted across both halves of the experiment. Those experiencing a
major depressive episode overvalued monetary pairs with a relative ratio of 2.67 throughout the
experiment, but they demonstrated monotonic preferences when the pairs were examined by
their absolute differences. Although surprising and counter to my hypothesis, community
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members experiencing a depressive episode were more willing to work harder for monetary pairs
that had a relative ratio of 1.33 than the control group.
Numerical Reasoning while Working for Reward
Overall, participants were willing to work harder when the potential reward was real
money (M = .51, SD = .30) rather than imaginary money (M = .37, SD = .32), t(175) = 3.00, p =
.003. This became more apparent as the discrepancy in reward value within pairs became larger.
In addition, participants spent more time making a decision when the potential reward was real
money (M = 1809 ms, SD = 917.1) rather than imaginary money (M = 1437 ms, SD = 1019),
t(175) = 2.50, p = .013. Although previous literature did not examine the initial valuation of real
versus imaginary rewards, my findings are somewhat consistent with existing research
demonstrating that imaginary rewards consistently elicit a similar pattern but an overall lower
level of wanting after reward discounting compared to real rewards (Johnson & Bickel, 2002).
Miyapuram, Tobler, Gregorios-Pippas, and Schultz (2012) found that individuals rate real and
imaginary rewards as equally pleasant, but the current study suggests that this does not indicate
that they are willing to exert the same level of effort for both types of rewards. Hübner and
Schlösser (2010) observed a similar pattern of behavior in which participants were willing to
work harder if they received monetary rewards were contingent on their performance (as our
community participants did) rather than receiving a flat payment for simply being part of a study
(as our undergraduate participants did for their participation credits). This is further supported by
individuals’ increased level of effort in occupational fields when payment is contingent on
performance (Goldsmith, Veum, & Darity, 2000).
When examining monetary pairs by their relative ratios, all groups of participants
throughout the entirety of both studies overvalued pairs with ratios of 2.67. This may be
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explained by the difficulty individuals have mentally computing fractions. Unlike integer and
decimal values, fractions are not automatically processed and require mental effort to manipulate
into a value that is more easily processed (Bonato, Fabbri, Umiltà, & Zorzi, 2007). Fractions also
are more difficult for individuals to manipulate in working memory than other types of numerical
values (Iuculano & Butterworth, 2011). In fact, even when fractions are explicitly mentally
manipulated, they are prone to more errors in value computation than other types of numbers
(DeWolf, Grounds, Bassok, & Holyoak, 2014). A potential explanation for the overvaluation of
the 2.67 ratio is the tendency for individuals to give greater attention to the numerator of a
fraction than they do to the denominator. Individuals who focus more on the numerator of a
fraction tend to make mistakes consistent with the whole number bias, such as comparing only
one component of a fraction (Hurst & Cordes, 2016). This would explain why participants chose
pairs with the ratio of 2.67 ($4.00 vs. $1.50) with similar frequency as pairs with ratios of 4.00
($4.00 vs. $1.00) and 8.00 ($4.00 vs. $0.50) but did not overvalue ratios of 3.00 ($1.50 vs.
$0.50). These findings suggest that the same monetary amount will not always be valued
identically in different situations; instead, a monetary amount’s value is affected by other
available rewards. This is further supported by participants’ approximately monotonic valuing of
pairs with a ratio of 1.33 ($2.00 vs. $1.50) and pairs with a ratio of 1.50 ($1.50 vs. $1.00).
In both studies, participants demonstrated quicker decision when choosing either the easy
or the hard task in second half of the experiment compared to the first half. This is most likely
due to participants becoming aware of the available monetary pairs. Surprisingly, participants
took longer to choose between the easy and hard task as the absolute difference or relative ratio
became larger. This is probably due to participants defaulting to the easy task unless they are
provided with a large enough discrepancy between the two amounts. Therefore it is likely that
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participants spend extra time contemplating whether the increased effort is worth the monetary
amount that can be obtained through the hard task. Although there is no previous research
supporting this notion, it is difficult to argue that individuals would default to choosing the hard
task without first examining the possible rewards.
Some of the difficulties involving basic mathematics may abate over time. Repeated
exposure to the same math equations leads to a lesser error rate (Charness & Campbell, 1988).
This may explain why participants in study 1 overvalued differences of $1.50 in the first half of
the experiment, but then corrected their reward preferences to be roughly monotonic in the
second half. This is further supported by depressed participants in study 2 also correcting their
overvaluation of pairs with differences of $1.50 in the second half of the experiment.
Unexpectedly, non-depressed participants in study 2 persisted in overvaluing pairs with
differences of $1.50 throughout the entire experiment, suggesting that working for monetary
rewards may cause continued overvaluation of this particular difference in non-depressed
populations.
Depressive Realism and Elevated Wanting
It is difficult to explain why community members experiencing a major depressive
episode demonstrated a monotonic reward preference when examining the absolute difference of
pairs in the second half of the experiment while community members in the control group
overvalued differences of $1.50 throughout the entire experiment. Previous research has found
varying results regarding math performance between depressed and non-depressed individuals.
Warren et al. (1984) observed no difference in performance on a mental mathematical task
between depressed and non-depressed individuals while Marcotte, Lévesque, and Fortin (2006)
found that individuals with depression performed worse in math classes.
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Indeed, my study provides two pieces of evidence for the first demonstration of
depressive realism in mathematically tractable effort-based decision making. Individuals with
depression were more likely to work harder for monetary pairs with a ratio of 1.33. Additionally,
corrected their reward preferences of absolute differences to a monotonic pattern in the second of
the experiment while controls persisted with overvaluing pairs. However, depression is not
always associated with performing in similar or superior ways to controls: High school students
with depressive symptomatology performed worse in their math classes than students who did
not display depressive symptomatology (Marcotte, Lévesque, & Fortin, 2006). This finding may
be a consequence of the higher stakes of the evaluation in these classes along with the need to
exert effort over the course of months rather than minutes, as in our study.
Contrary to the findings of Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, and Zald (2012) that
demonstrated individuals with MDD were less sensitive to rewards, individuals experiencing a
depressive episode in our study showed greater sensitivity to rewards by choosing the hard task
of the smallest absolute difference and relative ratio pairs more frequently than controls. A
possible explanation for this contradiction is the differences in study design. Treadway et al.
(2012) used varying amounts of rewards rather than ten fixed pairs. The easy task could be
chosen for one dollar while the hard task varied from $1.24 to $4.30. These widely varying
amounts prevented participants from creating decision-making strategies relative to other
possible rewards and elicited a “gut level” response rather than a calculated and reasoned
response. Additionally, Treadway et al. (2012) informed participants of the probability that they
would actually receive the money if they successfully completed a given trial. This design was
intended to engage the dopaminergic system through its sensitivity to probability and
uncertainty. Rewards involving uncertainty are associated with longer lasting dopaminergic
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responses and individuals with greater responses are more likely to work harder for lowprobability rewards (Abler, Herrnberger, & Spitzer, 2009; Treadway et al., 2012).
Activity in the dopaminergic system increases when wanting a reward; the greater the
release of dopamine, the more an individual is likely to report higher levels of wanting
(Treadway, Buckholtz, Schwartzman, Lambert, & Zald, 2009; Treadway et al., 2012). However,
the probability of receiving a reward also modulates dopaminergic activity. Specifically,
dopamine is released only on trials in which receipt of reward is uncertain (Abler, Herrnberger,
Grön, & Spitzer, 2009; Niv, Duff, & Dayan, 2005; Linnet et al., 2012). However, in my study,
rewards were given with 100% certainty after successful trials and allowed participants to
perform cost-benefit analyses for effort-based reward decision-making. Therefore, my findings
suggest that uncertainty may be driving the apparent deficits in wanting in Treadway et al.’s
(2012) behavioral findings. In summary, it does not appear that individuals with depression have
fundamental deficits in wanting. Instead, only tasks that strongly stimulate the dopaminergic
system, such as those with high levels of uncertainty, produce an apparent deficit.
Not engaging the dopaminergic system as strongly in the current study may also partially
explain the depressed group’s willingness to work harder for reward. Marcotte, Lévesque, and
Fortin (2006) found that individuals with depression performed worse in their math class than
their non-depressed peers. This study likely engaged the dopaminergic system due to the
uncertainty of the points and grades that they would receive on each exam over the course of an
entire semester. As previously mentioned, Warren et al. (1984) found no difference between
depressed and non-depressed individuals’ performance on a math test administered in a
laboratory. This situation is unlikely to engage the dopaminergic system due to the lack of
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uncertainty of the task; regardless of individuals’ performance, it did not influence their
compensation for participating.
My findings may have implications for the treatment of depression. For example,
behavioral activation is a prevalent therapeutic technique that attempts to help individuals with
depression address symptoms of decreased levels of energy and anhedonia (Soucy Chartier &
Provencher, 2013). In light of the findings that individuals with depression do not have
fundamental deficits in wanting (and are more willing to work for smaller relative rewards than
controls), using small rewards to guide behavioral activation treatment could prove successful.
Treatment may also benefit from the approach of depressive realism that was supported in my
study. Individuals may be more likely to comply with smaller, more realistic behavioral changes.
Limitations and Future Directions
There were several limitations to this study. The differences observed between
participants being offered imaginary money versus real money are confounded with participants
being recruited from either an undergraduate study pool or Craigslist. We also did not have
adequate data regarding participants’ income and social economic status (SES). Individuals with
a lower SES tend to report more depressive symptoms than those with a higher SES
(Zimmerman & Katon, 2005). Additionally, we did not include all possible monetary pairs. For
example, we did not include a pair with the absolute difference of $3.00. Another limitation is
that we did not include more extreme discrepancies. While it appears that absolute differences
reached an asymptotic pattern, the frequency of choosing the hard task was still increasing at the
largest relative ratio of 8.00. In future studies, it would be helpful to assess participants’
numeracy as a potential explanation for the observed nonmonotonic reward preference pattern
across both studies. Another potentially worthwhile future study would be an exploratory
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examination of moderating factors that explain the discrepancies found in the current study
associated with decreased levels of energy and difficulty thinking and concentrating in regard to
depression.
In summary, despite the assumption that individuals with depression would be less
willing to work hard for rewards, I found that they were actually more willing. Participants
frequently overvalued absolute differences of $1.50 and relative ratios of 2.67. Therefore
researchers should be cautious when examining relative and absolute values because it cannot be
assumed that individuals’ choices are meaningfully and monotonically ordered.
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